서강대학교

목차

Chapter 1. Algorithmic Coordination and the Limits of Intent-Based Antitrust 1
I. The Rise of Algorithmic Pricing and the New Coordination Problem 1
II. Why Current Antitrust Doctrine Treats Coordination Differently from Agreement 7
III. The Perspective of International Economic Law 10
IV. Definitions and Typology 14
V. Research Framework, Contributions, and Scope 17
VI. Methodology and Roadmap 24
Chapter 2. Mapping the Agreement Gap: A Doctrinal Analysis of Algorithmic Coordination 27
I. The Legal Barrier: Why Antitrust Law Struggles with "Human-Less" Coordination 31
A. The Requirement of "Human Agreement": Why Independent Parallel Pricing is Legal 31
B. The Limits of Indirect Proof: Trying to Catch Coordination via Data and Intermediaries 44
C. Comparative Note: EU's 'Concerted Practice' Doctrine 54
II. A Legal Classification of Algorithmic Coordination Types 57
A. The Mechanisms of Algorithmic Pricing 58
B. Defining the Classification Criteria and the Autonomy Spectrum 65
III. How Section 1 Applies Differently to Type I, II, and III Cases 68
A. Type I: Agreement-Based Algorithmic Collusion (Doctrinal Success) 68
B. Type II: Information-Sharing Coordination (The Contested Frontier) 70
C. Type III: Autonomous Emergent Coordination (The Doctrinal Challenge) 82
IV. Conclusion: Synthesizing the Intent-Based Enforcement Gap 93
Chapter 3. Evaluating Alternative Doctrines: Agency, Negligence, and the Limits of FTC §5 96
I. The Structural Incompatibility of Agency Law and Autonomous Algorithms 98
A. The Economic Mismatch: Divergence from Agency Costs and Least-Cost-Avoider Principles 100
B. The Failure of the Control Requirement: Incompatibility with Reinforcement Learning 108
C. The Mechanics of Negation: Why RL Defies Control 114
D. The Limits of Alternative Attribution: Ratification, Authority, and Negligence 119
E. The Exhaustion of Fault-Based Attribution: Foreseeability and the Ontological Mismatch 128
II. Tort Law: Negligence and Strict Liability 130
A. The Inapplicability of Negligence: Unclear Standards and Economic Inefficiency 132
B. The Conflict Between Strict Liability and Antitrust Policy 143
III. FTC Act § 5: A Constrained Alternative 148
A. The Doctrinal Limits of Section 5: The Ethyl Standard and Its Incompatibility with Algorithmic Pricing 150
B. Constitutional Constraints regarding Administrative Authority: Non-Delegation and Major Questions 158
IV. Cross-Cutting Evidentiary, Procedural, and Constitutional Barriers 164
A. Technical Opacity and Evidentiary Barriers: The Limits of Explainability and Discovery 165
B. Due Process Violations: The Impossibility of Fair Notice and Meaningful Defense 172
V. Conclusion: The Necessity of a Paradigm Shift 175
Chapter 4. A Three-Tier Regulatory Framework for Algorithmic Coordination : From Conduct to Architecture 177
I. The Problem and The Solution: Why Market Structure Matters More Than Intent 177
A. Beyond Human Conspiracy: The Structural Gap in Current Antitrust Law 178
B. The Core Theory: The "Dual Facilitator" Model 182
C. The Normative Foundation: Legal Analogies for Structural Regulation 203
II. The Tiered Framework: Architecture and Logic 211
A. Tier 1: Strategic Enforcement (Strengthening Existing Antitrust Authority) 224
B. Tier 2: Systematic Supervision (Preventive Monitoring for High-Risk Markets) 231
C. Legal Framework and Institutional Design for Tier 2 242
D. Tier 3: Architecture Liability, A Design-Based Framework for Algorithmic Accountability 248
III. Implementation Safeguards: Protecting Innovation, Due Process, and Agency Capacity 275
A. The Efficiency Defense: Ensuring Regulation Doesn't Kill Innovation 275
B. Constitutional Checks: Protecting Free Speech and Property Rights in Code 281
C. Building the Watchdog: Agency Structure and Expert Auditing 285
D. Monitoring and Periodic Review: Adaptability and Accountability 291
IV. International Dimensions: Harmonization, Enforcement, and IEL Conflicts 292
A. Regulatory Arbitrage and Extraterritorial Enforcement 292
B. Conflicts with International Trade and Investment Law 294
C. International Coordination and Regulatory Convergence 298
V. Conclusion 300
A. Synthesis of the Regulatory Architecture and Core Principles 300
B. The Normative Justification: Addressing Structural Harm 302
C. Balancing Innovation and Competition: The Role of RCAD 304
D. Implementation Challenges and Responses 304
E. The Imperative of Action 306
Chapter 5. Conclusion: Shifting from Intent-Based to Design-Based Regulation 306
I. Summary of Argument 307
A. The Doctrinal Gap: The Failure of Section 1 “Agreement” 307
B. The Failure of Alternatives: Agency, Tort, and Section 5 312
C. The Proposal: The Logical Necessity of A Tiered Regulatory Model 317
II. Core Contribution: Reframing Antitrust for the Algorithmic Era 322
III. Limitations and Frontiers for Future Research 328
IV. Final Reflection 337
BIBLIOGRAPHY 343