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The Clausewitzian Paradox : A Critique of the Nuclear Revolution

초록 (요약문)

Nuclear weapons are one of the most essential elements in international relations. Their destructive power has accorded them a special place in the eyes of scholars in international relations. Unfortunately, this special place has metastasized into benign neglect. A theoretical framework is available for nuclear deterrence but little available for its failure. This intellectual gap has paralyzed an analytical inquiry that begins and ends with the balance of terror or Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This study aims at filling this gap in the literature by applying traditional international theories - realism, liberalism and constructivism - to the analysis of nuclear weapons. Specifically, this study strives to restore Carl von Clausewitz’s reputation by applying his insights to the analysis of nuclear warfare. Though many argue that his work is still relevant for the study of conventional war, Clausewitz has largely been discarded as outdated and irrelevant for the nuclear revolution period. This study seeks to counter this narrative and question the assumptions about nuclear weapons and their use in war. Nuclear weapons can be discriminated. Contrary to popular belief, war is not a question of mere sophisticated calculations of quantity. Qualitative factors such as decision-makers in charge of launching these weapons are that much more important in nuclear war. One of the most influential international relations theories, realism, has no use for individuals. This is precisely where Clausewitz’s shines. Nuclear weapons did not revolutionize international politics. Nuclear weapons reconfirm Clausewitz’s timeless insight that war is politics by other means. His insights are more relevant than ever.

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