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Burden-Sharing in the ROK-US Alliance : Intra-Alliance Bargaining amid US-China Competition in East Asia

미중경쟁과 한미동맹의 협상력

초록/요약

The thesis investigates the effect of international polarity on the intra-alliance bargaining power in the Republic of Korea-United States military alliance. By expanding Snyder’s ‘scoring element of alliance bargaining,’ the thesis attempts to quantify the intra-alliance bargaining power change in the ROK-US alliance during the three most significant shifts in polarity in East Asia that the alliance has experienced. The analysis of the ROK-US alliance management in the 1950s, 70s, and 90s reveals that the change in power distribution to bipolarity increased the intra-alliance bargaining power of the ROK. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity increased the US’s bargaining strength. The ROK’s ‘national value’ growth increased its bargaining power; however, the cost of bandwagoning behavior had increased correspondingly. The bipolar competition has resurged in Asia shored up by the rise of China and the US’s determination to balance the rising power. The growing assertiveness of China’s foreign policy and the US’s strong will to retain leadership in the Indo-Pacific intensifies the bipolar competition. The emerging bipolar order has increased the ROK’s intra-alliance bargaining power; yet, the ROK’s bargaining power would regress in the protracted bipolar order. The augmented ‘national value’ of the ROK increased the cost of bandwagoning options, which would force the ROK to align closely with the US’s security strategies in Asia in the prolonged bipolarity.

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