Reciprocal Preferences and Expectations in International Agreements
- 주제(키워드) Global Public Goods , Coalition Formation Game , International Agreements , Reciprocity , Expectations
- 발행기관 서강대학교 일반대학원
- 지도교수 Doruk Iris
- 발행년도 2021
- 학위수여년월 2021. 2
- 학위명 석사
- 학과 및 전공 일반대학원 경제학과
- UCI I804:11029-000000065992
- 본문언어 영어
- 저작권 서강대학교 논문은 저작권보호를 받습니다.
초록/요약
This paper explores the implications of reciprocal preferences and countries' expectations towards others on international agreements to supply global public goods. Reciprocal countries reward kind (positive reciprocity) but retaliate against unkind behavior (negative reciprocity). We introduce a model where countries decide not only to participate or not but also how much effort to exert. We demonstrate that reciprocal preferences could have both positive and negative impact on the effort exerted by the signatories and non-signatories of a treaty, depending on the expectations towards others. Furthermore, participation in a stable treaty does either remain the same or shrink due to reciprocal preferences.
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