Subjective Beliefs in Coalition Formation Games
- 주제(키워드) Coalition formation , International agreements , Subjective beliefs , Optimism , Pessimism
- 발행기관 서강대학교 일반대학원
- 지도교수 Iris Haydar Doruk
- 발행년도 2020
- 학위수여년월 2020. 8
- 학위명 석사
- 학과 및 전공 일반대학원 경제학과
- UCI I804:11029-000000065317
- 본문언어 영어
- 저작권 서강대학교 논문은 저작권보호를 받습니다.
초록/요약
When dealing with global public goods, such as reducing air pollution or solving global climate problems, countries have incentives to free-ride. To guarantee contributions of themselves, countries form self-enforcing coalitions. Boucher and Bramoulle (2010) studied the effect of uncertainty on coalition formation and effort contributions. But there are many evidences that people behave with their own subjective beliefs, not according to the objective probabilities, when they face uncertainties. In this paper, I study the effect of subjective beliefs, defined with Rank Dependent Utility of Quiggin (1982), on coalition formations and the countries’ effort contributions. First, on the signatories’ effort contribution, pessimism has a negative effect while optimism has a positive effect. Second, I found the condition that the direction of the joint effect of subjective beliefs and risk aversion on signatories’ contributions, is opposite to the direction of their separate effect. Next, I found that subjective beliefs add or eliminate possible stable coalitions. In the final section, I suggest possible explanations of existing global coalitions with previous sections.
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