서강대학교

초록/요약

Although the basic structure of the US-led hub-and-spoke system remains largely in place, its substance is no longer the same as in the Cold War years. Some traditional US alliances are thriving, while others have not fared as well, and some new members have been elevated to this inner circle in the new strategic environment. Why have the security alliances of the United States with Japan, South Korea, and Australia expanded in scope beyond the specific requirements outlined in the mutual defense treaties to include a broader range of security issues and threats, while the security alliances of the Philippines and Thailand have failed to move beyond the confines of the Cold War interpretations of the mutual defense treaties that formed the basis for their respective bilateral alliance with Washington? What do the divergent trajectories of alliance transformation mean for the future regional security architecture for the Asia-Pacific? The central argument of this thesis is that divergence in alliance transformation in the Asia-Pacific has largely resulted from the capabilities gap among US allies in responding to the US request for the expansion of alliance functions and development of cooperative ties among its allies and partners in areas of common security interests. In the face of changing threats that require alliances capable of playing a greater role for regional and global defense as well as ad hoc coalitions and/or partnerships that promise high efficiency, the US is in desperate need of capable, interoperable, and trustworthy partners who will be able to narrow the capabilities gap and improve interoperability with US military that is becoming more technology-oritented. Deep cuts in defense spending, economic instability, and negative public opinions about US overseas military operations have also contributed to placing renewed emphasis on the role of capable and interoperable allies in US foreign policy. The United States stands at a very critical juncture in the history of American foreign policy given that it is confronted with the need to coordinate with its allies and partners with specific goals in mind, including preventing Russia from entering into an alliance with China, by addressing the following important questions: (1) Which countries can Washington call on to assist, and with which responsibilities; and (2) Who has the potential capacity, the relevant experience, and the willingness to assist, and then decide where to make investments to deepen capacity, where to shift responsibility, and where to accept greater risk.