서강대학교

초록/요약

Two conventional wisdoms about the political interpretation toward the IMF include two images: declining IMF or a stubborn structural constraint under the Washington Consensus. Drawing different implications from the existing wisdoms, this research tries to explain a core factor for explaining the following research question: Why IMF linkage differentiates in each regional financing arrangement (RFA). This research mainly argues that interpretation on the existence of IMF can be different depending upon the regional context and ‘region-specific’ institutional development within RFA strongly contribute to the differentiation effects of the IMF linkage. As findings of the practical dimension, in CMIM of East Asia, high IMF linkage can be reinterpreted as a strategic and self-centered means for the stronger states to buck pass political ownership and responsibility to IMF rather than the structural constraints of the United States. High IMF linkage will not likely to be reduced easily in the future, since East Asian states have a long way to achieve their own ‘region-specific’ institutional developments. FLAR of Latin America has achieved its own autonomy as credible reserve funds as well as the credit cooperative with no IMF linkage, although FLAR’s function is still limited for some cases which require huge lending size. Even though AMF is also de-linked from IMF, interpretation of this is uniquely different from that of FLAR. De-linking from IMF might mean that AMF is ‘insignificant’ and not threatening to IMF, since political ambitions are not that big and the fund size is limited. IMF linkage can mean ‘complementation’ only in Europe. Complementary relationship with IMF represents that intensified intra-regional interdependence can make Germany be cooperative with other European states and even IMF in initiating and activating ESM. As the research findings for theoretical dimension, it is implied that leader’s type can be an important issue in facilitating ‘regionalism’ in a certain issue area, although Grieco suggested that the stronger states will favor the regionalism, and weaker states do not. This behavioral variety of the stronger states can give a momentum to reconsider neo-realism oriented Grieco’s argument that ‘relative-gains’ problems can directly lead to uncooperative outcomes. In that sense, findings of research support Robert Powell’s argument that ‘strategic environment’ of interstate bargaining and cooperation can significantly influence on the institutional equilibrium. As methodological contribution of research, this research sought to consolidate the existing one-case analysis regarding the regional financing arrangement. With four cases and six comparative dyads, it tried to derive sophisticated insights and explanations from combinations of these cases and dyads rationally.