서강대학교

초록/요약

Intelligence Communities (ICs) in the world have had wide variety of failures through their history despite their persistent efforts not to witness any. Especially, two of intelligence failures, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has suffered from, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the “missing” weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, have led President George W. Bush in 2004 sign into the very first strategically significant changes in the American intelligence system since it was created at the end of World War Ⅱ. The series of its investigations and reports preceded and followed have attempted to identify the causes of those failures and to recommend corrective actions. These recommendations have usually emphasized the need for significant modifications in the organizational structure of the IC and for substantial enhancements of centralized authorities in order to better control and coordinate the priorities and funding of community entities. Would those reforms, structural and managerial, be the only ones IC fundamentally needed reviewing the errors it has witnessed against possible future mistake? Even with the gradual reforming process U.S. IC has been taken since it has been stroked by the terrorist attack in 2001, however, another accident shook around the whole country and the whole world again in 2003. What explanation can IC expect in regard to that? There is one more sector IC has missed to examine; individual agency (analyst). Psychological barriers in analysts’ sphere have been neglected to be studied deeply enough even with the basic notion of the very ground of analysis itself; especially, ‘confirmation bias’ this paper is studying is another essential defect IC needs to focus on curing. Bottom line is, it is the same goal in the end what IC has recommended for its reforming movement and what this paper strives to prove. That is the ‘improving the quality of intelligence community and lessening its error in the history of IC’, but with different two approaches: from the point of structure and management versus the point of analyst.