서강대학교

초록/요약

Few conflicts are as protracted as the one in Korea, where deeply hostile and anachronistic cold war attitudes have persevered for over half a century. One might assume that ideological antagonisms have decreased with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but in Korea much remains the same: A virulent anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist discourse prevails in the North while a more moderate but nevertheless anti-communist attitude permeates the South. Some improvements in the bilateral relations are visible but do not change the overall picture of Korea？s division. The purpose of this thesis is to draw attention to the socio-political implications of these underlying tensions between divergent national identities. I argue that the disparity in national identity between North and South Korea persist far beyond the ideological structures that initially created them. I will support my argument by focusing on the three following issues. First, I discuss antagonistic identity patterns in Korea by examining Juche ideology in the North and anti-communist strains in South Korean ethnic nationalism. My goal is to illustrate how these differing identity concepts within Korea are deeply interrelated. I will also emphasize the extent to which nationalism and the notion of cultural homogeneity can contribute to a better understanding and strengthening of human relationships in either Koreas, or even more importantly, how it can hamper a further harmonization between the two. The fundamental question is whether unification might be seen as an endgame by achieving the long-desired homogenization of the Korean people (minjok) or whether the differences after 60 years of division are too severe and deeply entrenched to really achieve the politically correct and sacred goal of unity in one homogeneous Korean nation. Secondly, I analyze the experiences of North Korean defectors in the South. How well have these defectors adapted to South Korean society? Are they respected for having integrated into their new environment? Or are they regarded as second-class citizens who form a minority group in South Korean society? What exactly can one learn from the experiences of these North Korean defectors in the South? All these questions seem particularly relevant regarding the drastic increase of North Korean defectors to the South. They can provide the South with reliable information about the North and above all, give the South an insight into the challenges that the entire Korean nation will encounter after the unification of the peninsula. Information from North Korean defectors can also serve as an indicator of how effective the control over information has been in the North. Therefore, I argue that North Korean defectors can reveal crucial differences in identity patterns between the North and South, and also that these differences persist far beyond the ideological images with which they are associated. They are deeply embedded in North and South Korean people？s assumptions about themselves and the world they live in. Thirdly, I explore the experiences of the German unification and its aftermath. There are limits to what one can learn from comparing post-unification Germany with pre-unification Korea. Most experts claim that Germany can not serve as a desirable model for Korean unification. But one may still derive some insights from the German experience. Korea can learn from the unification of an equally homogeneous nation that was also divided by the external dictates of cold-war politics. One significant feature characterized the immediate aftermath of German unification: the realization that four decades of very different socializations in East and West Germany had created highly different identities. These differences became manifest only after unification, so that one might assert that East Germans as well as West Germans were not really aware that they each created a peculiar West or East German identity during the long period of division. East Germans did in fact strongly identify with the old regime, even though it was generally perceived to be unjust and inefficient. But once it disappeared, people showed a strong emotional attachment to the order which had vanished and the concept of ostalgia ？ derived from nostalgia ？ as well as the notion of Wessi (West Germans) and Ossi (East Germans) became wide-spread throughout the transition period in the 1990s. Thus one may infer that the long process of socialization under the communist regime continued to manifest its power even after the regime？s demise, as the worldview acquired in this manner was how its inhabitants interpreted the new order. However, the clash or even xenophobia between Ossis and Wessis were not only a reflection of identity differences, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a reaction to the experiences in the immediate aftermath and transition period of the unification process.