서강대학교

초록/요약

The main objective of this study is to analyze internal negotiations of free trade agreement of the United States, Chile, and Korea in a comparative perspective. The study provides a comprehensive picture of the internal negotiation in the three cases utilizing an extended theoretical framework from Putnam’s and analyzes the impacts of presidential party and divided government on the outcomes of trade policy in the context of endogenous tariff formation using the panel data across the countries. To do so, we employed the model of Lohmann and O’Halloran(1994) to test the hypotheses. Based on this analysis, the study derives policy implications for Korea. Our major findings are summarized as follows. First, The outcomes of NAFTA confirm the theories of Putnam’s, Milner’s and Tarar’s and the outcomes of Chile-U.S. FTA are generally consistent with Putnam’s theory and support Milner’s and Tarar’s theories while KORUS FTA confirm Putnam’s and Tarar’s theories. Second, our comparative study shows that differences in the functions of institutions are considered to be critical elements in explaining the outcomes of FTA negotiations. Ineffective consultations and coordination with interest groups, and unclear responsibilities of agencies for domestic coordination make domestic politics difficult and complicated. Third, President’s political leadership plays a pivotal role on the passage of FTAs. However, this variable is flexible. Because, not all Republican Presidents act like Republican and not all Democrats Presidents act like Democrats. Forth, In the econometric analysis, the regression results of the president’s parties in Korea and Chile show that Republican presidents are more liberalized than Democratic ones, while the U.S. results provide no robust evidence regarding the impact of the president’s party on trade policy. Chile’s result of a divided government is opposite to the results of the United States and Korea, although this result is not statistically significant. In fact, the results of divided governments in the United States and Korea support Schelling’s conjecture and Tarar’s theory, even though it is not statistically significant in the case of Korea. Lastly, several policy implications for Korea are derived from the case studies conducted above. It is important to establish an independent institution to deal with both international and internal negotiations simultaneously. The major functions of this institution are as follows: (i) to increase the close relationship between executive and the Congress; (ii) to establish national consensus on FTA issues; (iii) to collect diverse interests from constituencies and government agencies; and (iv) to implement domestic adjustment and provide side payments effectively. Key words: internal negotiation, free trade agreement, two-level game, institution, president’s party, and divided government.