'Covert Action' as a Foreign Policy Tool of the US : Explaining Motives of Secrecy
- 주제(키워드) covert action , covert operation , CIA
- 발행기관 서강대학교 국제대학원
- 지도교수 김재천
- 발행년도 2009
- 학위수여년월 2009. 2
- 학위명 석사
- 실제URI http://www.dcollection.net/handler/sogang/000000045116
- 본문언어 영어
초록/요약
In the vernacular of American intelligence community, US covert action refers to secret attempts by the US government to influence the behavior of foreign states or governments. During the Cold War era, the American decision makers made an extensive use of covert action to bring about regime changes in Third World countries. ？Plausible deniability？ is one of the most important elements of covert action. At the time of US covert action, the decision makers of the US were able to deny American involvement in most of covert operations undertaken in Third World countries. American decision makers took great pains and went great lengths to deny American involvements in those covert operations. What motivated the US decision-makers to use covert action instead of other foreign policy means? What was the target of secrecy? This thesis attempted to uncover the motives of American decision makers when they decided to use covert action as particular foreign policy tool to accomplish foreign policy objectives during the Cold War era. Two hypotheses offer different explanations about the motives of decision makers when they opt to use covert action as particular foreign policy means. ？External constraints？ hypothesis stipulates that decision makers used covert action in order to evade negative international publicity, to avoid direct confrontation with the Soviets over the states or regions that the US was intervening, and to protect agents and agencies that already infiltrated the target states of American covert action. In contrast, ？internal constraint？ hypothesis stipulates that American decision makers attempted to outskirt domestic institutional constraints by using covert action. Two case studies ？ PBSUCCESS in Guatemala from early Cold War period and CONTRA WAR in Nicaragua from the late Cold War period ？ were conducted to evaluate validity of internal and external hypotheses. The results of case studies seem to indicate that American leaders used covert action to evade both negative international and domestic publicity. CIA, the lead agency for American covert action during the Cold War era, was going through identity crisis in the wake of sudden collapse of Cold War international order. Covert action was no longer thought of as legitimate foreign policy tool of the US. However, 911 once again brought CIA and covert action at the forefront of US foreign policy making. Covert action is expected to remain as important foreign policy tool of the US in this age of international terrorism.
more목차
Ⅰ.INTRODUCTION = 1
Ⅱ.COVERT ACTION IN THE US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES = 4
1.The US Intelligence Community and Intelligence Activity = 4
The concept of intelligence and the types of intelligence activity = 5
CIA and the US intelligence community = 10
The origin and development of CIA = 15
2.Development of the US Covert Action = 17
The notion of covert action = 17
Cases of covert action during Cold War era = 21
Ⅲ.WHY COVERT ACTION?: DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS FOR UNDERTAKING COVERT ACTION = 23
1.External Constraint Explanation of Covert Action = 24
2.Internal Constraint Explanation of Covert Action = 27
Ⅳ.CASE STUDIES: PBSUCESS IN GUATEMALA AND CONTRA WAR IN NICARAGUA = 30
1.US Covert Action in Guatemala in 1954: PBSUCESS to Overthrow Arbenz Regime = 31
Brief History of the Case = 33
National Interests of the US in Guatemala = 37
Why covert action in Guatemala? = 40
2.US Covert Action in Nicaragua in 1980: Contra War to Overthrow Sandinista Regime = 47
Brief History of the Case = 47
The National Interest of the US in Nicaragua = 50
Why Covert Action in Nicaragua? = 55
Ⅴ.THE IN INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION IN THE POSTCOLD WAR ERA = 60
1.Crisis of Covert Action and CIA toward the End of the Cold War = 60
2.War against Terrorism and CIA Covert Action = 66
3.911 and Creation of National Clandestine Service (NCS) = 71
Ⅵ.CONCLUSION = 75
1.Summary = 76
2.Implications for US Foreign Policy = 78
BIBLIOGRAPHY = 81
INDEX = 86
