서강대학교

목차

This study examines Korea-U.S. Telecommunications Talks of 1989-1992 and 1996-1997 in order to identify the major factors that determined the outcome of the negotiations. While the two negotiations surrounding the telecommunications market between Korea and the U.S. were alike in character such as trade conflict on the same industry, involving the same countries, and deployment of similar negotiations strategy by the U.S. employing the Super 301, the processes and results of these two negotiations were quite different. This thesis proposes that the interactions between the domestic and international levels must be understood in order to explain the different processes and outcomes of international negotiations. Drawing on the concept of the two-level game in international negotiations suggested by Robert Putnam(1988), this study demonstrates how domestic factors such as domestic economic situation, preferences of domestic interest and political groups, as well as domestic institutions have an effect on the different sizes of win-sets at the international negotiations leading to different results of negotiations. The intended contribution of the present thesis is to explore the usefulness of two-level games for applied research on the Korea-U.S. Telecommunications Talks of 1989-1992 and 1996-1997.