사적정보 하의 최적사전계약의 특성 : On the characteristics of the optimal precommitment contract under priovate information
- 주제(KDC) 320.000
- 설명문(일반) 이 연구는 2002년도 수암 연구비의 지원 하에 진행되었음
- 발행기관 서강대학교 경제학연구원
- 발행년도 2002
- 총서유형 Journal
- 본문언어 한국어
초록/요약
This paper analyzes the characteristics of the optimal pre-commitment contract under private information by using a simple partial equilibrium model. It shows that if the maximum fine is not binding at the optimal solution under public information then the optimal pre-commitment contract under private information can achieve the optimal solution under public information. If the maximum fine is binding, then the optimal pre-commitment contract under private information can not achieve the optimal solution under public information, yet improves the situation under the standard capital control. It also analyzes the characteristics of the pre-commitment contract relative to the optimal solution under public information, in the case of the maximum fine being binding.
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