과점 시장에서 쿠르노 균형과 버트란드 균형의 비교 : Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium in oligopoly market
- 주제(KDC) 320.000
- 설명문(일반) 본 연구는 2002년 서강대학교 교내연구비 지원으로 이루어졌음
- 발행기관 서강대학교 경제연구소
- 발행년도 2003
- 총서유형 Journal
- 본문언어 한국어
초록/요약
Cournot competition where firms compete with quantity and Bertrand competition where firms compete with price are two major modes of competition in oligopoly market This paper reviews the existing result comparing these two equilibria in the literature and adds some new results Section 2 compares two equilibria in a homogeneous good market with a general cost structure It provides the complete characterization of Bertrand equilibrium. It also provides an example where the Bertrand outcome is less competitive that Cournot outcome. Section 3 compares two equilibria in a differentiated product market It introduces the results by Singh & Vives ( 1984) and Cheng (1985) that in a very general setting, Cournot outcome is always less competitive than Bertrand outcome Section 4 compares two equilibria in the infinitely repeated game It calculates the smallest value of discount factor which supports the collusion using the most severe punishment so-called 'the optimal penal code' developed by Abreu(1986, 1988) With the optima] penal code, collusion is more easily supported in Cournot competition than in Bertrand competition
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