NON-COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING REGIME : A STATE-LEVEL EXPLANATION
Quinanola,AllanGimoros (International Relations, Graduate School of International studies)
- 발행기관 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SOGANG UNIVERSITY
- 지도교수 Jaechun Kim
- 발행년도 2012
- 학위수여년월 2012. 8
- 학위명 석사
- 학과 및 전공 국제대학원 InternationalRelations
- 실제URI http://www.dcollection.net/handler/sogang/000000047816
- 본문언어 영어
- 저작권 서강대학교 논문은 저작권 보호를 받습니다.
- 초록 moremore
- The international anti-terrorist financing regime has been established as part of the global effort to address the threats posed by international terrorism. Despite the presence of international institutions that seek for states’ domestic enforcement of anti-terrorist financing measures, however, ma...
- The international anti-terrorist financing regime has been established as part of the global effort to address the threats posed by international terrorism. Despite the presence of international institutions that seek for states’ domestic enforcement of anti-terrorist financing measures, however, many scholars and experts in the field have shared the observation that states have become less compliant with the regime. There are state- and system-level explanations that have been explored in the previous studies, but the ‘interest group’ hypothesis seems to offer a more plausible and convincing alternative explanation to the problem. This research is specifically aimed to answer the question: To what extent have the domestic interest groups hampered the compliance of states with the anti-terrorist financing regime? As this study examines only the causal impact of interest group activity on the states’ regime compliance, it does not downplay the causal significance of the other variables, videlicet: states’ institutional capability, and states’ regime type. This study is significant and contributory to the field of international relations in the sense that it attempts to explore some underlying forces behind the failure, if not reluctance, of some states to comply with the regime that many systemic theories often tend to minimize. This study uses a comparative case study method with Indonesia and Malaysia as the cases selected. The examination of these two cases confirms significantly the hypothesis being tested. The case of Indonesia illustrates how the viii domestic interest groups have helped shape certain domestic policies but at the same time hindered the compliance with the anti-terrorist financing regime, while the case of Malaysia illustrates how a strong state precludes a wider political involvement of various interest groups in its national policies and becomes successful in creating a legal framework, administrative infrastructure, regulatory measures, and in its enforcement of anti-terrorist financing measures. Keywords: regime, interest groups, terrorist financing, Indonesia, Malaysia